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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (17 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694195

26 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Period Ending 31 October 1969

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (Tnl C)  
APO San Francisco 96243

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
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Commanding General  
1st Logistical Command  
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United States Army, Pacific  
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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR)  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Inclosure

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

1. Section 1. Significant Activities

a. During the quarter the 4th Transportation Command established and is operating a river port at Ben Keo to service Tay Ninh. Personnel from the US Army Transportation Battalion, Saigon (Provisional) were assigned to Ben Keo to supervise the discharge/backloading and documentation of cargo. During the quarter 4000 S/T were discharged, or the equivalent of 400 truckloads of cargo. The record for the period was the 299 tons off-loaded 23-24 September. During the month of September the site off-loaded more than 2000 S/T of all classes of cargo. All type of watercraft were employed in convoys to Tay Ninh including LCM-8's, LCU's and BC barges. The Division Support Command Commanding Officer was enthusiastic in his support of this operation as a means of providing logistic support to the Division's base camps. Nonetheless, as the quarter came to a close the Tay Ninh operation and increasing demands for support of the Delta required close and intensive management of our watercraft assets.

b. Continuing requirements for operations at Ben Keo and the substitution of water craft for line haul highway for logistics support of the Delta taxes the assets of the 4th Transportation Command. To meet this challenge, on 17 October the Can Tho Express (CANTEX) was initiated. This is a system of scheduled water convoys between Newport, Vinh Long, and Binh Thuy in the Delta. During the week ending 31 October, the total tonnage handled by the CANTEX was about 2500 S/T. Because of this systemization of convoys to and from Delta ports, the Command assets have been able to meet the increasing requirements placed on them.

c. The ARVNization of Saigon Port took on a new look with the berthing of the SA Harry Culbreath at K-10, 161000 Aug 69. It was a complete ARVN Operation except for the use of a US Army floating crane used to handle heavy lifts. The vessel sailed 170830 Aug 69, less than 24 hours after berthing. Another step came with the arrival of the Mormacvega on 29 Aug 69. The ARVN cargo was discharge by STTC and the US cargo by Saigon Battalion. This marked the first time US and ARVN personnel worked a ship simultaneously. Thus far, all ARVN-US Operations have been accomplished satisfactorily. The discharge of these two vessels by the ARVN represented a saving to the 4th TC budget of about \$3,600.00 in stevedore contract costs.

d. The TC HERIDIA berthed at the RoRo pier, Newport 171515 Aug 69 to become the first reefer (chill and freeze) vessel at Newport. The Hibueras was the first ship with only chill cargo to berth at Newport. The chill cargo only vessels usually have a 24-hour turnaround. The Hibueras berthed while the chill and freeze ship San Jose was discharging. Both ships were able to discharge in a normal manner. The move to Newport was accomplished because of the close out of the chill and freeze storage areas in Saigon and the opening of new facility

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in Long Binh. This reduces time and pilferage by not going through Saigon with loaded trucks and is in conjunction with the overall plan of shifting operations to Newport.

e. On 21 Aug 69, 4th TC's 3rd Barge Derrick became operational again after an absence of approximately one year. It had been in shipyard for repair. With the addition of this BD once again, more heavy lifts can be accomplished, thus greatly aiding ship turnaround.

f. SWITCH PROJECTS: During the period 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69, this command participated in the "ARVN Modernization and Improvement Program" by transferring (SWITCHING) the complete TOE of the 231st Medium Boat Company to an ARVN counterpart. Through the diligent efforts of the 159th Transportation Battalion, the equipment was in excellent condition when transferred. This command has now been tasked with the turnover of the 1097th Medium Boat Company. The 544th Transportation Company, with an augmentation of personnel from HHD, 159th Transportation Battalion, is currently preparing 27 LCM's, equipment of the 1097th Transportation Company (Med Bt), for turnover to ARVNs with ETC of 15 December 1969.

g. Equipment Densities: Constant reconciliation and follow-up has increased the command's equipment density to such an extent that no critical shortages exist. Five 40-ton crawler cranes were added to the authorization of HHD, 71st Transportation Battalion, on MTOE 55-116EP04. This action provided Newport the authorization for a crane previously deleted by a change in the TOE of terminal service units.

h. IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DELTA: Upon relocating the harbor-master office from Dong Tam to Vinh Long a requirement for establishing communications between Vung Tau and Vinh Long existed. A check of the Vinh Long area revealed that Vinh Long is located in a depression and the surrounding elevation blocked radio operations. An antenna mounted on a 60 foot pole was installed at Vinh Long to obtain desired elevation. As a result of a test shot conducted on 14 Sep 69, contact was made between Vung Tau and Vinh Long through the use of this 60 foot pole antenna system. The successful completion of this project eliminated the need for establishing a relay station at Dong Tam.

i. (1) During the reporting period the Maintenance Assistance Team conducted roadside spot inspection of vehicles throughout the command. Analysis of scores reveals that all units are continuing to progress toward attaining satisfactory standards in this area.

(2) Out of the nine Command Maintenance Inspection conducted by the 1st Log Comd during the quarter seven units attained satisfactory ratings. The

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two units failing these inspections were deficient in the area of operations. Pre-CMMI's were conducted by this headquarters on a continuous basis in an effort to eliminate unsatisfactory maintenance conditions.

j. Improved Water System, Camp Davies: The converting of the water system at Camp Davies, Saigon from river water to fresh water was completed on 21 Oct 69. Components utilized in this system are recoverable and can be returned to the supply system when no longer required. PA&E will continue to improve the new system by installing a standby pump and service drap to provide power from the electrical distribution system. After 72 hours of operation the water showed considerable signs of clearing at the tap which indicates a good possibility of obtaining potable water at all taps. The water system will be super chlorinated to 5.0 PPM at the tap to clear the distribution system.

k. Advancements in the Automated Cargo Management System: During the period August - October 1969 significant progress was made with regard to improvements to and expansion of the Automated Cargo Management System being implemented in the command.

(1) Improvements in the content and use of documents.

(a) Vessel Discharge Tallies: A computer generated special discharge tally for reefer cargo is now produced enabling checker personnel to tally cargo by commodity as well as TCN. The new tally provides commodity descriptions and is sequenced by commodity.

(b) Cargo Manifests: In September 1969 Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command requested the 4th TC to program for local computer application the preparation of a special manifest format for all ocean cargo entering RVN. This manifest is accompanied by a Supply Class Summary that was being prepared manually at a cost of 150 to 200 manhours per week. It now takes approximately 3 hours.

(c) Preprinted TCMDs:

1. Color coded, prenumbered TCMDs were introduced into Vietnam operations during the reporting period.

2. Special preprinted TCMDs for SEALAND containers that include content data, extracted from the manifest to include FSNs are now being produced.

(d) Reports.

1. A monthly computer printout of outstanding TCMD transactions is now being produced. This report identified consignees who have in their possession TCMDs that should have been signed to acknowledge receipt of cargo.



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2. A service order work sheet to assist in the rapid payment of stevedore contractors is now being produced and provided to contracting and procurement personnel.

3. A monthly port performance report ( i.e. tonnage by berth) is now being prepared for management purposes.

1. Automation Expansion: Computer produced documentation was introduced into the port operations of Vung Tau and to a limited degree at Cat Lai. A unique challenge was overcome in that the geographical separation of the computer facilities and these two ports introduced an element into the implementation of the system that was not encountered with Saigon Port and Newport.

m. Turnaround Times: During the reporting period ending 31 October 1969, the following terminals of the Command experienced the following turnaround data:

1. Saigon Terminal:

- (a) 68 vessel worked.
- (b) 2.5 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.1 average number of days waiting.

2. Newport Terminal:

- (a) 102 vessels worked.
- (b) 3.0 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.2 average number of days waiting.

3. Cat Lai Terminal:

- (a) 31 vessels worked.
- (b) 7.5 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.6 average number of days waiting.

4. Vung Tau Terminal:

- (a) 34 vessels worked.
- (b) 1.5 average number of days working.
- (c) 0.0 average number of days waiting.

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n. CONUS Loading of Saigon/Newport Bound General Cargo: Based on recommendations received from 1st Log, MSTS, CONUS terminals are loading deep draft vessels for port calls at Saigon and Newport. Newport(RGU) is considered the receiving port for US Army cargo and Saigon(RG1) the receiving port for ARVN and USAID interest cargo. Since the management system requires an offering of cargo several months prior to arrival of cargo at RVN destination, the system is not yet in full swing, however, several vessels have arrived with mixed RG1/RGU shipments. All cargo for Saigon/Newport previously had been offered for shipment to RG1, and US Army cargo manifested for RG1 is still being received. Eventually, vessels departing CONUS ports will be completely loaded with RG1 or RGU, so an inter-port shift from Saigon to Newport and vice versa will not be necessary, with all US Cargo to be discharged at Newport and with increased ARVNization of Saigon, all ARVN and USAID cargo to be discharged at Saigon.

o. During the reporting period, refrigerated cargo receiving depots moved from Saigon to the depot complex at Long Binh. As a result, all reefer ships are now being discharged at Newport. Several new methods have been developed in reefer discharge. All freeze cargo is now being loaded on closed USATSA vans using warehousing pallets. Use of vans reduced strain on contractor assets, releasing them for use somewhere in the logistics system. Use of warehouse pallets eliminates costly time previously used by depots in restacking cargo, also speeding truck turnaround. These methods along with command emphasis has reduced reefer ship turnaround from 7 days to 4.4 days.

p. Port commanders are responsible for physical security within the ports and are aided in accomplishing this responsibility by direct support military police units. This supporting and supported unit concept appears workable, however in actual practice it has been less than satisfactory. The supporting military police units have been unable to provide the needed support on a continuous basis. This is caused by continual strength shortage in the supporting units and by possible over extension of capability through assignment of other missions. The support provided normally amounts to something between one third and two thirds of the required support. Physical security has been maintained through the use of unit personnel performing guard duties which detracts from the accomplishment of port operational mission. The emphasis on physical security and importance of having a sound security program requires that supporting military police units be kept at a strength level sufficient to provide the needed support.

q. Weapons security has continued to receive emphasis. In this reporting period one incident occurred involving a weapon. An enlisted man who was temporarily beserk fired a number of rounds from an M-16 rifle without injury to anyone. One accidental shooting occurred when an enlisted man preparing for guard duty failed to follow established procedures and was shot with his "unloaded" rifle, through the knee. The control and security of weapons has shown considerable improvement over previous periods.

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r. A review of the status of merchant seamen as concerns enforcement of military curfew was made in September and October. Although US Army Vietnam Regulations reflect that merchant seamen are subject to military control, other events and agreements reflect that merchant seamen are not subject to military jurisdiction or control. As a result the curfew enforcement for merchant seamen will be that imposed by the government of Vietnam rather than the curfew established for military personnel.

s. A total of 27 arms room inspections and 28 physical security inspections were performed by the Provost Marshal's office during August, September, and October. These inspections are in addition to those performed by higher commands or internally within the subordinate units. These inspections assist in keeping the new commanders and security officers aware of their responsibilities in the security area.

t. Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) received in the Provost Marshal Office for tracer action amounted to 344 for the three month period. Investigation disclosed that consignees had erroneously stated non-receipt of cargo on 139 TCMDs when the cargo had actually been received. Receipt of cargo was highly probable in 21 shipments covered by TCMDs but could not be absolutely established due to lack of supporting documentation. 124 TCMDs received in late September and October are pending final investigation.

u. Pilferage of cargo remained at a relatively low level during this reporting period. The total reported pilferage was \$8,551.00 compared to \$9,392.00 for the last period. The amount this period was only 15.4% of the same period in 1968. This is indicative of tighter accounting, documentation, and handling. The shortage of security guards (ref, para p), however casts doubt as to whether all pilferage is being reported.

v. Cost per Short Ton Handled: Monthly cost per short ton handled, command-wide, has dropped from last quarter's average of \$8.83 to a \$7.42 average this quarter. The decline is explained by a reduction in military strength and lower stevedore contract rates for FY-70.

w. For the period 1 August to 31 October 1969, 19,280 S/T cargo has been shipped by rail. The types of cargo shipped were asphalt, steel, cement, lumber and vehicles. The use of rail to ship cargo for this period, released 2,750 10 ton vehicles, so that they could be utilized for other commitments in the Saigon, Long Binh area.

x. ARVNization:

(1) On 12 August, five ARVN soldiers began a 30 day on-the-job training program at Newport at the Rigging Loft. They learned the fundamentals of rigging to include characteristics of wire and fiber rope. Trainees were graduated on 5 Sep 69 at STTC; certificates were presented by COL Stendeback.

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(2) On 13 August three ARVN soldiers began OJT at MMAV Det #4, Saigon. Their training program will be 90 days and they are receiving instruction in marine maintenance. Specific skills learned are gas engine and diesel engine repair, transmission repair and Quality Control Inspections.

(3) On 15 Aug 69, two ARVN NCO's began training at Newport as supercargoes. Training was OJT and lasted for 60 days. Graduation for the NCO's was on 13 Oct 69 at STTC; LTC Russell made the presentations.

(4) On 7 Aug 69, one entire ARVN Heavy Boat Crew (12 men) was placed on an LCU for on-the-job training. The US crew was reduced to five which included the master, chief engineer, boatswain, assistant engineer and cook. The LCU 1523 was to continue running US missions and was under the operational control of the ACoS, G3, 4th TC. Missions were restricted to the normal 4th TC area of operation. The training was considered experimental in that the 4th TC is to train an entire Heavy Boat Company (ARVN) in the fall of 1969, and needed a format for the training. All aspects of this program have been successful and the basic format established on the LCU 1523 will be continued when the 305th Heavy Boat Group (ARVN) is trained by the 4th TC.

(5) On 1 Oct 69, LTC Nhung, Commanding Officer of STTC and Colonel Murray co-signed a thirty day agreement outlining the responsibilities for the administration, coordination, and control and movement of cargo and the joint US-RVNAF operation of the Saigon Port. ARVN was given a warehouse which was used for the temporary staging of ARVN cargo.

(6) On 22 Oct, an ARVN NCO began on-the-job training in cargo plans, G-3. His training is for 90 days, and will be part-time since he is the Operations NCO at STTC.

(7) On 23 Oct an ARVN Corporal began training as a radio operator in the Harbormasters Office at Saigon and Newport. He is assisting the Harbormaster Trainee, CPT Ren.

(8) On 27 Oct, at Vung Tau, 28 ARVN trainees graduated from the on-the-job training program at the 159th Trans Bn. Graduates included Vessel Master Trainees, Chief Engineer Trainees and Marine Maintenance Trainees. Certificates were presented to the graduates by LTC Ernst, Battalion Commander. Major So, STTC, presented LTC Ernst with an ARVN Transportation plaque for his help and friendship.

(9) On 31 Oct, seven ARVN tug boat masters received 4th TC certificates for completion of on-the-job training at the US Army Harborcraft Company, Saigon. The certificates were presented by Colonel Murray and LTC Nhung at STTC.

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2. Section 2: Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Port Clearance by Peril Contract Vehicles.

(a) OBSERVATION: Since the start of the Peril vehicle contract on 1 October 1969, vehicle support for the terminals has been poor for the period 1 October to 31 October 1969. The one exception is the clearance of chill and freeze cargo from Newport by the 48th Transportation Group. The sporadic arrival of ships and the backloading at Newport are the main factors precluding the Saigon and Newport Terminals from being cubed out. On 17 and 18 October, Newport and Saigon approached their space limitations and again on 25 and 27 October Newport approached its space limitation. Only the combination of additional support from the 48th Transportation Group (which was provided drivers from other units) and the decrease in ship arrival, kept the terminals from being cubed out.

(b) EVALUATION: With the present assets available in the transportation system, cargo will be delayed in being cleared from the terminals and the potential threat of cubing out the port will be overshadowing the whole operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional assets be made available for port clearance.

(2) ITEM: Reduction of the time for 4TC to pay Stevedore Contractors.

(a) OBSERVATION: It was taking as long as sixty days to pay stevedores for service rendered.

(b) EVALUATION: A project was launched to reduce the amount of time taken to pay stevedores. A closer liaison was developed between 4TC and the stevedore contractors. Automated tallies replaced manual tallies which significantly reduced the time frame. Through a combined effort of terminals and concerned staff section, the time frame to pay contractors for these services was reduced to an average of 25 days after completion of service.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the close liaison between 4TC and stevedore contractors be continued.

2. That other similar areas that can use ADP, consider automation as a partial solution.

(3) ITEM: DOD Reg 4500.32-R (MILSTAMP) - MACV (MILSTAMP) Handbook.

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(a) OBSERVATION: MILSTAMP contains a multitude of information that is superfluous to surface shipment documentation operations in Southeast Asia.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to September 1969 shipping activities in the Republic of Vietnam were burdened with the necessity of having to search for information on documentation preparation in the DOD MILSTAMP Regulation. The regulation in the original DOD published form is voluminous, cumbersome and difficult to work with. There were also many instances when copies of the regulation itself and/or current changes were not readily available. Having recognized this fact a project was commenced to scrutinize the information contained in the regulation and to extract only that information pertinent to operations in Vietnam. This action resulted in the publication in September of a MACV (MILSTAMP) Handbook on the preparation of shipping documentation that has improved documentation tremendously.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all geographically defined transportation operations dealing with surface shipping extract those portions of the DOD Reg 4500.32-R (MILSTAMP) pertinent to their specific geographical area and have the major command publish a handbook and distribute same to shipping activities.

(4) ITEM: Limited Uses of Preprinted Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMDs).

(a) OBSERVATION: Preprinted TCMDs cannot be utilized for all shipment units.

(b) EVALUATION: The Automated Cargo Management System provides for the preprinting of TCMDs. Each TCMD identifies a single shipment unit manifested aboard a vessel. Only one shipment unit can be recorded on a TCMD due to the fact that it cannot be predetermined as to how a truck will be loaded. This being the case an individual TCMD would have to be carried by the driver for each shipment unit on the truck. In some instances this caused the driver to carry eight or nine TCMDs for a single truck load of small general cargo. This procedure was causing an inordinate workload on port documentation personnel. Consequently this procedure was stopped and preprinted TCMDs are now prepared on bulk cargo only. The method used to determine what cargo to prepare preprinted TCMDs for is determined by commodity. Primary categories are FOL, vehicles and special heavy lifts, Conexes, Sealand containers, pallets, etc.

(5) ITEM: Documentation and Cargo Marking of Reefer Cargo.

(a) OBSERVATION: Shipments of chill and freeze subsistence are arriving in RVN with only 10% of the cargo marked.

(b) EVALUATION: The Cargo manifest for reefer cargo does not always include nomenclature as required by DOD Reg 4500.32-R (MILSTAMP). Without cargo marking



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or identification of cargo with a manifested Transportation Control Number (TCN) the cargo checkers can not properly tally. The lack of proper markings, makes it impossible to prepare accurate outturn reports and to account for the movement of the cargo to the first destination consignee. In an attempt to account for reefer cargo, with some degree of accuracy, procedures were established whereby manifest data is listed on discharge tallies by commodity code. After the number of pieces reflected for the identified TCN is tallied the checker continues to tally the next TCN for the same commodity. This procedure is repeated for each commodity discharged from a hatch. Accurate accountability still can not be obtained since MILSTAMP commodity codes do not furnish nomenclatures. For example, commodity 180 can be any kind of frozen meats and the manifested TCN is for a specific type (ie T-Bone Steak, Pork Roast, etc). Compliance with MILSTAMP is required if accurate accounting of cargo is to be accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: CONUS terminals and MTMTS activities, receiving cargo for shipment to overseas area, should monitor the shipping activities to insure reefer cargo is marked and documented in accordance with MILSTAMP prior to acceptance of cargo for onward movement.

(6) ITEM: Duplicate Transportation Control Number (TCNs) in Cargo Documentation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Bulk items such as beer, beverages and vehicles shipped from vendors or contractors in CONUS are not always marked or documented in accordance with MILSTAMP, causing duplicate TCNs to enter the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

(b) EVALUATION: This duplication makes it impossible to trace or account for cargo utilizing automatic data processing techniques to record shipment data. In the case of beer and beverages, the TCN marked on the cargo does not include the suffix or the partial or split shipment codes. However, the cargo manifest does. Cargo checkers record the last three characters as XXX or do not record anything. When this happens a manual check must be made to determine the correct characters to be applied. Vehicle TCNs are duplicated by shipping activities filling requisitions from different supply sources, not marking the correct suffix code on the cargo and failure to include the suffix in the construction of the TCN, prior to offering the cargo for movement. Computer programs were modified to enable data to be processed and still retain the correct voyage number for accountability of each shipment unit. This was accomplished by changing the last character of the TCN whenever a TCN entering the computer matched a TCN recorded previously and the voyage number was different. This procedure allows computer processing of shipment documentation and provides a more accurate tracing capability.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: DOD should emphasize the importance of having complete

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TCNs on all documentation and shipments. Personnel knowledgeable in MILSTAMP should continually monitor procedures used by contractors, preparing shipments to enter the DTS, to insure compliance with the regulations.

(7) ITEM: Documentation of Ammunition and Explosives.

(a) OBSERVATION: Cargo manifests for ammunition and explosives received from CONUS ports in many cases are incomplete and missing important data (ie. lot number, DOD identification codes (DODIC), pieces, weight and cube) required by MILSTAMP as part of ammunition and explosive identification entries in the trailer data associated with a given TCN.

(b) EVALUATION: The lack of accurate manifest data slows down the discharge operations and onward movement of cargo since no preplanning can be accomplished prior to physically checking the lot numbers and DODICs on the cargo. A message was forwarded to Eastern Area MMTS defining the problem and requesting assistance in obtaining the data required to properly plan the discharge and delivery of ammunition and explosives.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Eastern Area MMTS should monitor ammunition and explosives cargo offering documentation from shipping activities, to insure all data required by MILSTAMP is included in the Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD) prior to accepting the offering as a valid booking.

(8) ITEM: Assignment of VOYAGE Document Numbers for Intra-Vietnam Vessels.

(a) OBSERVATION: MSTS, RVN is unable to comply with DOD Reg 4500.32-R (MILSTAMP) in the assignment of Voyage Document Numbers for Intra-Vietnam Vessels.

(b) EVALUATION: This is causing difficulty in computer processing shipment information for Intra-Vietnam vessels. MILSTAMP requires the assignment of a separate voyage number to each voyage of a specific vessel. The procedure used for Intra-Vietnam vessels is to assign a voyage number to a vessel for one month and utilize the voyage reference code to distinguish voyage and ports of call. MSTS representatives in Saigon state that the reason for these procedures is a lack of sufficient voyage numbers in the MILSTAMP overall numbering scheme to properly identify each voyage. Presently these vessels are being computer processed by using the voyage reference code in place of the second digit of the voyage number, for example VDN K8934, reference code C, is input into the computer system as KC934. This method of processing is undesirable because it requires the changing of the VDN on all computer input and output data in order to correctly document the vessel. A message has been sent to MSTSFE explaining the problem and requesting that additional voyage numbers be assigned to MSTS Vietnam.



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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional voyage document numbers to be assigned to MSTs Vietnam and that MILSTAMP procedures for the assignment of voyage document numbers be followed.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) ITEM: Lack of Qualified Supply Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: The lack of qualified supply personnel adversely affected unit supply accounting. The assignment of untrained personnel to the task of maintaining property books resulted in increased discrepancies in property books, voucher files, and clothing records.

(b) EVALUATION: As a result, the G-4 Supply Section commenced conducting constant courtesy visits to subordinate units and using the inspection techniques as a teaching vehicle for training supply personnel. Progress has been slow, but recent AGI inspections produced no major supply deficiencies.

(2) ITEM: SOI Compromises.

(a) OBSERVATION: There were a number of possible compromises of the unit SOI, (Signal Operation Instructions) during the quarter.

(b) EVALUATION: This was overcome by placing greater emphasis on control in safe guarding these classified SOI's. To further the program, Signal Section, G-4, started a poster program to remind individuals of their responsibilities in safeguarding classified information.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increase training and emphasis be placed on safe-guarding of SOI's and other classified information in CONUS and overseas service schools.

(3) ITEM: Deadline Rate - MHE.

(a) OBSERVATION: The MACV tolerance level for deadlines MHE is 20%. The command rate in July was 18%. Maintenance management tools were used to new efficiency during the reporting period and this rate has dropped to 10%. This significant accomplishment in lowering the non-availability rate for MHE can be attributed to:

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 14th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

1. Improved PII procedures throughout the command. Much effort was expended in training PII clerks and supervisors as to correct supply procedures. This resulted in more timely and accurate requisitions and aggressive follow-up actions. The greater availability of repair parts obtained in this manner significantly decreased deadline time.

2. Comprehensive pre-CSMI's were conducted by this command with emphasis on MHE. These thorough inspections helped to identify many maintenance management problems areas that were solved through continuous coordinations, improved communications, and expeditious actions by maintenance personnel.

3. On-site MHE spot check inspections were initiated to detect operating conditions and status of equipment. This action has eliminated a lot of abuse and insures proper operator maintenance.

4. Classes of instruction to commanders and supervisory personnel on the proper use and maintenance of MHE. Also, classes on maintenance procedures were given to unit operators and mechanics, as well as safety classes.

5. Continued command emphasis to all levels on all aspects of maintenance with special emphasis on MHE assets. This includes statements in the efficiency reports of all officers with maintenance responsibilities as to how well they discharged those responsibilities.

(b) EVALUATION: The institution of these procedures and controls has effectively affected the command MHE deadline rate by lowering it to 10% below MAGV tolerance level of 20%.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the programs outlined above be continued with command emphasis by all 1st Log Comd elements.

g. Communications: None

h. Material:

(1) ITEM: Lighting and Guards on the water side of barge piers, deep draft vessels and lighterage.

(a) OBSERVATION: A need has existed to provide security on the water side of moored barges, other lighterage, deep draft vessels and empty berths. This security combines guard personnel and lighting. A suggestion was made that an artillery barge be employed as a floating guard post. This type of barge was selected because of its size, the presence of a plotting room and availability. A guard bunker was built on top of the plotting room which provided a raised area with sufficient strength to support the weight. Two 30' light towers were

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

built on either side of the plotting room slightly forward of the bunker. A portable lighting set was used for the luminaries and generator power. The only modification required to the barge was welding metal brackets to the plotting room roof to secure the bunker and spot welding the towers to the deck for stability. The generator was placed in existing metal protected space. This barge has been used as a floating guard post moored outboard of other barges at USAT Newport. Initial evaluation reveals that it will be effective and has other possible uses in the area of night operations where portable lighting is required.

(b) RECOMMENDATION: That evaluation on use of this barge as a guard post continue and this submitted suggestion be brought to the attention of other ports for possible adoption and employment.

i. Other:

(1) ITEM: Department of Agriculture/Inspector General Report.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Department of Agriculture in conjunction with USAID conducted an audit of stevedore payments made by 4TC during FY-67 and FY-68. The results claimed MACV (4TC) overcharged USAID by 2.3 million dollars and MACV (4TC) overpaid stevedore contractors by 1.2 million dollars. Meetings at 1st Logistical Command, USARV and MACV with USDA/USAID decided that the allegation of 2.3 million dollars USAID overcharge would not be investigated as results could only affect bookkeeping entries between agencies; the stevedore overpayments would be investigated.

(b) EVALUATION: An initial audit by ACofS, Comptroller, 4TC revealed a discrepancy concerning the base used in the report for calculation of overpayments. A later, more thorough study was conducted by Comptroller, 4TC assisted by a representative from LLC and USARV to verify the validity of the reports. The study disproved over \$650,000.00 of the 1.2 million dollars charge of overpayment. Original suspicions were correct as USDA/USAID made two invalid assumptions. The first was basing their calculations for stevedores payments on the metric ton - 4th TC pays on either measurement or long tons as specified in stevedore contracts. The second invalid assumption was their definition of Saigon Port which was contrary to that definition stated in stevedore contracts. The only overpayment allegation that was substantiated was a claim of \$125,000.00 duplicate payment by MACV (4TC) and ships carrier which was verified in the amount of \$85,639.50 by an auditor from the Army Audit Agency. Higher headquarters will determine whether a claim will be filed to recoup this amount.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Army units under study or under audit be consulted during the study to insure valid assumptions and authentic results.

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

*William A. Silvestri*  
*JN* A. J. SILVESTRI *Col TC*  
COLONEL, TC *DCO*  
Commanding

3 Incl

1 - Organizational Chart

~~2 - Command Personnel Listings~~

~~3 - Visitors Roster~~

Incls 2 and 3 wd HQ, DA

AVCA SGN GO S (10 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 4th Transportation Command (Tml C), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)


HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 4 DEC 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310  
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO MH, APO 96384

1. Reference Section II, paragraph c(1), page 9. CONCUR. Additional truck assets will be made available for port clearance if space limitations are approached. In addition, the civilian trucking contractor experienced personnel and driver problems on dates specified in paragraph c(1)(a). These problems have now been solved by the contractor.
2. Reference Section II, paragraph c(2), page 9. CONCUR. In order to maintain the reduced time frame of paying contract stevedores, liaison between stevedore contractors and the 4th Transportation Command should continue.
3. Reference Section II, paragraph f(2), page 13. CONCUR. Additionally, it is within the capability of the 4th Transportation Command to provide additional training on safe guarding SOIs and other classified material.
4. Reference Section II, paragraph h(1), page 14. CONCUR. Where applicable, lights should be mounted on 10-15 foot portable towers so that the portable lights can be employed on the outer barges when the modified artillery barge is placed in a cluster of barges.
5. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command. A copy of this indorsement has been furnished the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2604

  
MICHAEL D. HUSTON  
CPT AGC  
ASST AG

AVCA GO-MH (10 Nov 69) 2 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 4 JAN 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning DOD Regulation 4500.35 - R, page 9, paragraph c(3). Concur. This handbook has proven highly successful. Inspection and audits of documentation indicates shipment clerks are using this document although they would not use the much more voluminous DOD regulation.

b. Reference item concerning limited use of preprinted TCMD's, page 10, paragraph c(4). Concur. Although preprinted TCMD's cannot be prepared for all cargo, the bulk of cargo handled is included in categories listed as being suitable for preparation of preprinted TCMD's.

c. Reference item concerning documentation and cargo marking of reefer cargo, page 10, paragraph c(5). Concur with recommendation. In addition, terminal transshipping and receiving activities should report deficiencies in marking in accordance with provisions of AR 700-58 using DD Form 6. This headquarters will, by message, bring the problem to the attention of appropriate shipping activities.

d. Reference item concerning duplicate TCN's in cargo documentation, page 11, paragraph c(6). Concur with recommendation. This headquarters will, by message, bring this problem to the attention of appropriate shipping activities.

e. Reference item concerning documentation of ammo and explosives, page 12, paragraph c(7). Concur with recommendation. To permit identification of responsible shipping activities, 4th Transportation Command has been asked to furnish specific instances of non-compliance by CONUS shipping activities to this headquarters. This information will then be passed to the appropriate Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) area headquarters with a request for corrective action.

f. Reference item concerning assignment of voyage document numbers for intra-Vietnam vessels, page 12, paragraph c(8). Concur with recommendation. COMSTS-V is limited to two blocks of 1,000 numbers each (F8000-8999 and K8000-8999). A recommendation for MILSTAMP change will be submitted by this headquarters.

AVCA GO-MH (10 Nov 69) 2 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)(U)

g. Reference item concerning SOI compromises, page 13, paragraph f(2). Concur. The recommendation proposed should certainly help in rectifying the difficulty; however, strong supervision and on-the-job training at the working level should also be practiced.

h. Reference item concerning deadline rate - MHE, page 13, paragraph f(3). Concur. This recommendation will be submitted for inclusion in the monthly maintenance newsletter which is distributed command-wide.

i. Reference item concerning lighting and guards on the waterside of barge piers, deep draft vessels and lighterage, page 14, paragraph h(1). Concur. The use of barges for security purposes appears to be an excellent means of reducing pilferage, and in hostile areas such as Vietnam, provides an additional deterrent to swimmer/sapper and small craft attacks. This headquarters has a vital interest in this project and will coordinate with the 4th Transportation Command in evaluating the effectiveness of the floating guard post, in additional uses for the barge, and in preparing drawings and written information for other ports and waterway activities.

j. Reference item concerning Department of Agriculture/ Inspector General Report, page 15, paragraph i(1). Action has been taken by this headquarters to have collection proceedings initiated in an attempt to recoup the overpayments made to the applicable stevedoring firms. Recommend higher headquarters publish guidance in the form of an Army Regulation, similar to AR 36-6, "Action on U.S. Army Audit Agency Audit Reports" and AR 36-20, "U.S. General Accounting Office Audits," for all other external audit/ inspection agencies.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

*Thomas P. Hyatt*  
J. C. D. STAFFORD

1Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

19

CF:  
USASUPCOM, SGN  
4th TC Comd

AVEGCO-DST (10 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 23 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Department of Agriculture Report/Inspector General Report", page 15, paragraph 2i(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2j; concur with recommendation. Although valid, should the situation described be frequent, this office would agree that a special regulation as indicated in 2d Indorsement be prepared, however; the frequency of audits by US Department of Agriculture Inspector General, and representatives of USAID are such that the need for a regulation is extremely questionable.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. E. MICHELS

MAJ, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy Furns  
4th Trans Cmd  
1st Log Cmd



GPOP-DT (Undtd) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Transportation Command for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JAN. 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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